الأبعاد الإقليمية للسياسات التركية - الإيرانيةجدلية التعاون والتنافس على النفوذ والقيادة

Abstract

Turkey and Iran as the two neighbouring countries can be described as relatively comparable with regard to the geographical, demographic and socio-economic dimension. Yet, next to the numerous similarities and levels, on which they can be assessed as comparable states, there are also multiple significant differences and dissimilarities between these two countries. These factors, both similarities and differences, account for the nature of relations between Turkey and Iran, which can be briefly described as characterised by great dynamics both regional and global. Hence, Turco-Iran regional perspective have gone through an unprecedented period of rapprochement. Ideological and security issues that dominated the relations between the two neighbours have been gradually replaced by pragmatic considerations on each side. A number of developments both at the state level and regional level have promoted pragmatism. The ensuing improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations has been crowned by a rapidly increasing volume of economic interactions between the two countries as well as security and diplomatic cooperation on a number of issues. In addition to the upgrading of bilateral ties, the two countries’ regional approaches related to the Palestine issue, preservation of territorial integrity of Iraq, Iran’s right to have “peaceful” nuclear technology, etc. have ostensibly converged. However, a number of developments that took place in 2011, including the revolt in Syria, the escalation of terror activities perpetrated by the PKK, have overshadowed Turkey-Iran relations. Moreover, the Arab spring has profoundly altered the regional environment and has led to Turkey’s reconciliation with the West, particularly with the United States, on a number of issues in the region including the uprising in Syria. It also culminated in the differentiation of Turkish and Iranian regional perspectives and it is this new regional context that accounts for the emerging tensions between Turkey and Iran. despite missile problems, Turkey and Iran had other reasons to cooperate, including their anti-Israeli policy and bilateral trade. Though the Turkish dreams of a new world order based on the supremacy of Turkish Sunni Islamism have recently foundered against regional and global realities, Ankara has not abandoned its hopes for a Sunni bloc a group of satellite states paying servitude to the emerging Turkish empire. Ankara's regional ambitions also pose a major obstacle to more stable and peaceful relations across the border. Nor for that matter have the Iranians abandoned their hold on a Shiite crescent opening up to the Mediterranean Sea. These two ambitions, rooted as they are in historical sectarian rivalries, are fundamentally unbridgeable although they may recede from time to time. The Arab Spring has intensified the historic rivalry between Turkey and Iran, two of the Middle East’s most powerful nation-states. Although economic cooperation between the two countries has improved in the past decade, Turkey and Iran are increasingly at odds onnumber of issues in the Middle East, particularly Syria. The relationship between these two important countries presents some opportunities, as well as challenges, for U.S. interests in the region. Thus, Turkey has used its dual Western-Muslim identity to create a role for itself as a potential mediator between conflicting civilizations. Many of these efforts have been admirable, but they have also led to a misunderstanding of Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives. Sometimes what appears to the AKP government as mending ties between conflicting parties is interpreted by Western nations as condoning perverse behaviour. In the case of Iran, Turkey claims to be in solidarity with the West in putting pressure on Tehran, but its policy of economic cooperation threatens to undermine these efforts. On the other hand, neither US attempts at isolating the country nor European endeavours at diplomatic talks have deterred Iran from its nuclear ambitions or other rogue behaviour. Therefore, from a pragmatic perspective, if international pressure is ineffective and Turkey stands to benefit from engaging Iran, Ankara can make a strong case for continuing to do so. The West can take comfort in the fact that there is enough skepticism about Iran in Turkey and enough policy divergence between the two countries, that it is highly unlikely that Turkey would ever choose Iran over the West. Yet, the Western world should continue to engage Turkey. If Turks feel that their bid for EU membership is hopeless or that the U.S. is wavering once again on the PKK issue, they could be tempted to move closer towards their Eastern neighbour. In this sense, this compartmentalization strategy requires that both Turkey’s and Iran’s primary strategic interests be insulated against these risks, which is a tough job in the long run. Unlike Iran, Turkey has become a country of quick and unusual foreign policy reactions. The list of regional issues that cause troubles for Ankara is long, and that makes its foreign policy a bit unstable. In contrast, Tehran refrains from abrupt foreign policy reactions, an important difference that might give Iran an advantage. Iranian political elites likely think that they have a historic opportunity (since the revolution) to come back into the international system through legitimate mechanisms. Not wanting to lose this opportunity, Tehran acts calmly, even on critical matters. A deep examination of what Iranians say about regional issues reveals that Iran is not much concerned about Turkey’s capacity to harm its interests. As a result, Iran will be the more tolerant partner in the Turkey-Iran compartmentalization strategy, lest its grand strategy of reviving links with the global Western system be at risk. However, it is possible for Iran’s rivals to engage in more aggressive policies to offset Iran’s influence, and this could potentially destabilize the region. Still, upon implementation, the nuclear deal will open the door for further economic development and financial benefits for Iran’s major trade partners, especially Turkey. One the other hand, the “blocks competition,” when Turkey or Iran play key roles, increases the political costs and difficulties of U.S. policies in the region, causing the United States to be unable to form a line of allies on the major Middle Eastern issues. Moreover, in some cases, Turkey and Iran may make the United States face dilemmas reminiscent of those posed by the Turks and Kurds crises.